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Abstract
Background: The Nigerian National Health Act proposes a radical shift in health financing in Nigeria through the
establishment of a fund – Basic Healthcare Provision Fund, (BHCPF). This Fund is intended to improve the functioning
of primary health care in Nigeria. Key stakeholders at national, sub-national and local levels have raised concerns over
the management of the BHCPF with respect to the roles of various stakeholders in ensuring accountability for its use,
and the readiness of the implementers to manage this fund and achieve its objectives. This study explores the
governance and accountability readiness of the different layers of implementation of the Fund; and it contributes to
the generation of policy implementation guidelines around governance and accountability for the Fund.
Methods: National, state and LGA level respondents were interviewed using a semi structured tool. Respondents were
purposively selected to reflect the different layers of implementation of primary health care and the levels of
accountability. Different accountability layers and key stakeholders expected to implement the BHCPF are the Federal
government (Federal Ministry of Health, NPHCDA, NHIS, Federal Ministry of Finance); the State government (State
Ministry of Health, SPHCB, State Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Local Government); the Local government (Local
Government Health Authorities); Health facilities (Health workers, Health facility committees (HFC) and External actors
(Development partners and donors, CSOs, Community members).
Results: In general, the strategies for accountability encompass planning mechanisms, strong and transparent
monitoring and supervision systems, and systematic reporting at different levels of the healthcare system. Non-state
actors, particularly communities, must be empowered and engaged as instruments for ensuring external accountability
at lower levels of implementation. New accountability strategies such as result-based or performance-based financing
could be very valuable.
Conclusion: The key challenges to accountability identified should be addressed and these included trust, transparency
and corruption in the health system, political interference at higher levels of government, poor data management, lack of
political commitment from the State in relation to release of funds for health activities, poor motivation, mentorship,
monitoring and supervision, weak financial management and accountability systems and weak capacity to implement
suggested accountability mechanisms due to political interference with accountability structures.
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Background
Good health system governance is characterized by re-
sponsiveness and accountability. The extent to which ac-
tors interact in governance, as well as the institutional,
bureaucratic and social factors that influence these inter-
actions, all work together to ensure health system
accountability. Accountability features prominently in all
governance definitions, either as a key function or
outcome and improved accountability is often called for
as an element in improving health system performance.
Three general categories of accountability have been
noted: financial, performance, and political/democratic
accountability [1]. Financial accountability concerns
tracking and reporting on allocation, disbursement, and
utilization of financial resources, using the tools of audit-
ing, budgeting, and accounting and focuses on the
control of the misuse and abuse of public resources and/
or authority. Performance accountability deals with sup-
porting improved service delivery and management
through feedback and learning and focuses primarily on
services, outputs, and results while political/democratic
accountability has to do with the institutions, proce-
dures, and mechanisms that ensure that government
delivers on electoral promises.
All health systems contain accountability relationships
of different types, which function with varying degrees
of success. In addition to the three general categories of
accountability, an important broad distinction is between
‘external’ accountability mechanisms which may be used
by non-state actors to hold public sector power-holders
to account, and ‘internal’ accountability mechanisms that
are comprised of the institutional oversights, checks and
balances internal to the public sector [1, 2]. Accountabil-
ity mechanisms therefore are governance tools which
seek to regulate answerability between the health system
and / or citizens and between different levels of the
health system [3].
The concern with accountability and health systems
originates from the dissatisfaction with health system
performance, availability and equitable distribution of
basic services, abuses of power, financial mismanage-
ment and corruption, and lack of responsiveness [4]. In
addition, proper accounting for the use of primary
health care (PHC) funds is a high priority for both gov-
ernments and donors because of the importance of PHC
in delivering health care to the majority of the populace.
Therefore, strengthened accountability has been recom-
mended as a remedy for strengthening health system
weaknesses around the world [4].
In October 2014, following a decade of planning, the
Nigerian President signed into law the National Health
Act (NHAct). The Act, provides a legal framework for
the provision of health care services to all Nigerians and
for the organisation and management of the health
system. This could not have come at a better time as
Nigeria currently has some of the worst health outcomes
in the world, due in part to the poor state of primary
health care services. For example the 2013 National
Demographic Health Survey (NDHS) shows that the com-
mon preventable diseases like malaria, diarrhoea and
malnutrition are major causes of morbidity and mortality
in children; maternal mortality is 576/100,000 and U5MR
is 69/1000 live births with life expectancy of 52.62 years.
Antenatal care attendance and delivery by skilled health
providers were 61 and 38% respectively; and only about a
quarter of children were fully vaccinated.
A key component of the NHAct is the establishment
of the Basic Health Care Provision Fund (BHCPF) which
will be predominantly financed through an annual grant
from the Federal Government of not less than 1 % of the
Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) which is the total
Federal Revenue before it is shared to all tiers of govern-
ment. Based on the draft Medium Term Expenditure
Framework and Fiscal Strategy Paper (MTEF&FSP)
2017–2019, the BHCPF (1% of CRF) translates to an
average of N35bn per annum or 114.7 million US dollars
per annum as at 2016. Half of the Fund will be used to
provide a basic package of services in PHC facilities
through the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS);
45% will be disbursed by the National Primary Health
Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) for essential
drugs, maintaining PHC facilities, equipment and trans-
portation, and strengthening human resource capacity;
and the final 5% will be used by the Federal Ministry of
Health (FMOH) to respond to health emergencies and
epidemics. Additional sources of funding for the BHCPF
could include grants by international donors and funds
generated from innovative sources such as taxes on ciga-
rettes and alcohol. Further, to be eligible for Fund dona-
tions, States and Local government areas are expected to
contribute 25% counterpart funding respectively towards
PHC projects. It is expected that provision of this fund
will ensure that quality primary health care provisions
are affordable and accessible to all and thus equitable.
Governance & Health service organization in Nigeria
The Country operates a federal system of government
comprising 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory.
The health system in Nigeria is based on the three tier
structure of government (Federal, State and Local
Government Authority (LGA) each with substantial
autonomy. Every state and local government has a State
Ministry of Health (SMOH) and Local Government
Health Department respectively. However, the roles and
responsibilities of the different levels of the health
system with respect to PHC are unclear. The overlaps in
roles often result in duplication of efforts and wastage
on one spectrum, or total neglect of roles [5]. The
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federal government through the Federal Ministry of
Health (FMOH) is primarily responsible for overall stew-
ardship and leadership for health. The SMOH provides
health care services through secondary level health facil-
ities as well as technical assistance to the Local Govern-
ment Area Health Departments. LGAs own and fund
PHC facilities and have overall responsibility for this
level of care with the health posts and clinics, health
centers and comprehensive health centers providing
basic primary care services. A dynamic private sector
offers an opportunity to fill part of the gap left by a weak
PHC system. However, health equity is not very high on
the policy agenda, thus creating a problem of affordabil-
ity and accessibility among the poor and the less advan-
taged groups [5].
Financing lies at the core of Nigeria’s PHC delivery
challenges. The PHC budget at the Federal level has
been decreasing over the past four years. It decreased
from 8.4% of total spending in the health sector in 2012
to 4.7% in 2015 [6]. At the LGA levels, the financial
allocations do not extend beyond the payment of salaries
and budgets are not earmarked, leading to delays in the
release (or at times non-release) of PHC funds. Account-
ability and transparency are some of the weakest areas
of the public finance system in Nigeria, particularly at
this level.
Figure 1 shows the current flow of funds for health
services in Nigeria and the proposed flow of revenue of
the BHCPF. The solid and dashed arrows show the
normal and minor flows respectively while the yellow
arrow shows the proposed flow of the additional fund.
At the Federal level, the NPHCDA is responsible for
transferring funds from the FMOH to the State Primary
Health Care Boards (SPHCB), who then disburse funds
to Local Government Health Authorities (LGHAs). It is
LGHAs that are responsible for funding PHC services in
their area.
It has been noted that the LGAs responsible for PHC
services have weak capacity and inadequate resources to
deliver effective PHC, and the NHAct therefore is an
Fig. 1 Flows of funds from health services
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attempt to provide additional funds to PHC. But add-
itional resource allocations through the NHAct will need
to be complemented by action to strengthen LGA
capacity to deliver PHC services. Formal and informal
engagement with key health stakeholders at both
national, sub-national and local level by some of the
authors have raised concerns over the management of
the funds, and the roles of various stakeholders in ensur-
ing accountability for their use. There are still questions
about how ready the various stakeholders are to manage
this fund since the inappropriate use of the money will
lead to difficulty in achieving the objectives of: 1)
increased effective funding; and 2) improving the
responsiveness of the Nigerian Health System. In order
for the flow of revenue from the BHCPF to reach PHC
services efficiently, it is necessary that strategies are in
place to ensure accountability between the stakeholders
at different levels of government as the absence of an
accountability lens can actually hamper implementation
of the BHCPF and hence health system performance as
well as compromise equity.
The overall aim of this study, undertaken before the
Bill became law, was to contribute to the generation of
policy implementation guidelines around accountability
for the BHCPF, by exploring the existing accountability
challenges within the Nigerian health system and gather-
ing ideas from health system stakeholders to inform
proposals around how to strengthen accountability for
the Fund’s implementation.
Methods
Study design
This was a qualitative study conducted in Nigeria at the
Federal Capital, Abuja and a southeastern state between
August 2014 and February 2015. Anambra state was
selected for the study because previous work on the
effects/impacts of a local accountability structure on
health service delivery, resource mobilization and trust
by Consortium for Research in Equitable Health Systems
(CREHS) had been done in the state and findings from
that study was used as an input component in data
collection and analysis. These findings included the fact
that functionality of a local accountability structure was
enhanced by health worker behaviour, and stakeholder
supports while de-motivation of health workers, power
tussle/social conflict within the community and lack of
information about the local accountability structure
constrained its functionality [7].
Data collection and analysis
In-depth interviews with key actors at federal (Policy
makers, development partners and donors, civil society or-
ganizations) state (Policy makers, directors, programme
managers) and LGA programme managers, health Facility
heads) levels.
were conducted. Respondents were purposively
selected to reflect the different layers of implementation
of primary health care and the levels of accountability.
To ensure purpose selection, the authors made enquiries
from some stakeholders at the different layers of imple-
mentation of primary health care on who were likely to
be involved in implementing the BHCPF. Then these
key stakeholders were selected for the interviews. The
authors also relied on their own judgment on the likely
key stakeholders based on their knowledge of the partici-
pants. Representatives of relevant institutions and offices
(National Primary Health care development Agency and
National Health Insurance Scheme) who are also key
actors that will be involved in implementing the BHCPF
were included.
The National Health Bill was first sent to State and
LGA officials who were asked to carefully read it. This
was followed by interviews with key actors at the
national, state and LGA levels to elicit their views on
their roles and responsibilities, implementation strategies
and accountability process with regards to the Fund.
Analysis of initial interview data fed into the next set of
interviews, allowing respondents reflect on these find-
ings and react to them.
Information was collected in a cascade starting from
the policy makers at the federal level to the actors at the
state and LGA levels, in that order. Findings from every
level were analysed and presented to respondents at the
next level during interviews to elicit their reactions. This
was necessary to compare views across levels and allow
the testing of different sets of actors’ views with each
other. Collecting information ‘in a cascade’ top-down,
presents a good approach to exploring perspectives that
can help elucidate meaningful information to broaden
understanding for policy implementation as policy
makers’ viewpoints on issues is “tested” through middle
managers and frontline managers. To minimize response
bias in this approach of data collection, respondents
were first asked questions from the interview guides
before findings from preceding interviews were
discussed. Interview guides were developed and adapted
to different levels and groups of respondents. The ques-
tions were structured to elicit respondents’ views about:
(i) what they understand their roles in implementation
of the Fund to be, and how this compares with their
current roles, the challenges/opportunities they envisage
in fulfilling these roles and what is clear or not clear in
the Bill with respect to their roles; (ii) the mechanisms
or strategies they think should be put in place to ensure
accountability in the implementation of the Fund, who
should be involved, how and to what extent they should
be involved, and what linkages should exist between
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actors; (iii) existing accountability structures, and how
these will enable or constrain internal and external
accountability in implementing the BHCPF; the chal-
lenges in accountability that may be encountered in the
flow of funds as stipulated in the Bill; and how best they
think the Fund and its accountability should flow.
A total of 24 in-depth interviews and 2 focus group dis-
cussions were conducted: 7 in-depth interviews (IDIs) at
the national level (including 2 development partners and 2
CSOs); 4 IDIs at the state level; 13 IDIs at the LGA level;
and 2 focus group discussions (FGDs) at the ward level.
The choice of IDI or FGD for the different respondents
was based on appropriateness of the tool and feasibility of
its application using previous experiences of interviewing
similar actors [8, 9]. Thematic and framework approaches
were used to analyse data. Interviews were audio recorded
and transcribed verbatim. The transcripts were edited for
grammar errors and coded using NVivo software version
10. Information extracted through the coding framework
was then analysed.
Results and Discussions
Current accountability mechanisms
The existing internal accountability mechanisms at the na-
tional level according to the different respondents include
a tracking and verification system. This involves the
proper documentation of fund that has been allocated for
certain activities based on budgetary provision and subse-
quent retirement of the said funds after expenditures are
done. This system, which also has a consumer complaint
component, consists of a framework that has been de-
signed to take into consideration all expenditure as well as
all income received through, for example, capitation, and
re-imbursement. Hence a framework exists to track both
income and expenditure, and this was noted by most of
the respondents at the federal level. However, one re-
spondent captured it thus in the following quote:
“we use capitation and fee for service method so …
funds can be tracked easily…NHIS does verification to
make sure money given to HMO’s reach providers”
(Federal Government Official).
As in the national level, the state government also uses
the budget tracking accountability system to monitor ex-
penditure and resource allocation patterns in projects.
According to a state government official, this process
has been made easier with the establishment of a good
governance committee that tracks and monitors budget
releases and implementation:
“there is a good governance committee at the state
level, there is a vanguard for good governance committee
in every LGA, they also monitor expenditure and budgets
to make sure the budgets are being implemented. They
track the budgets making sure budgets are being
implemented” (State Government Official).
The state also uses periodic audit checks, public re-
lease of funds and community participation as external
accountability mechanisms. According to two of the four
respondents, the public release of funds entails using dif-
ferent media sources to make budget releases known to
the general public; and this enables them to know where
to seek for answers when things are not going as ex-
pected. The state introduced community participation as
an external accountability strategy in which members of
the community and religious organizations are involved
in budget planning, resource allocation, implementation
and monitoring of public health activities in their com-
munities. This fact was noted by all the state respon-
dents, but one respondent noted that:
“this government is reputed for what we call budgeting
forum, every year before the budget comes out, the
governor conveys a huge forum, where they ask
stakeholders what they want to see in the next year’s
budget” (State Government Official).
Majority of the 13 respondents at the LGA level were
in support of the opinion that the state government
operates a system of accountability where there are
active checks and balances. For instance, a government
official stated that the procurement act in the state
ensures that no single individual purchases materials for
a project; rather, a committee is constituted, with a
supervisory arm, to verify any purchases made:
“we have always checks and balances, and you know in
Anambra state, we now use our procurement act. You
can’t easily as a single person go to market to make any
purchase” (Local Government Official).
In the local government, the presence of experienced
treasurers and auditors was perceived as an important
accountability mechanism. These people, they believe,
have stayed long enough in the system to know where
the loopholes are and how to effectively verify monetary
transactions. Equally important is the existence of a
decentralized accounting system that consists of local
health facility committees and the finance and general
memorandum committee for the management of local
government funds. This committee works with guidelines
that enable them sustain functionality of the LGA
accountability mechanism by monitoring and continuous
tracking of funds at the LGA level. Other accountability
structures mentioned are: (i) supervisory committees such
as health committees in the LGA legislature; (ii) funds
retirement process; and (iii) use of multiple signatories to
LG accounts. Supporting quotes are.
“We have supervisors, their job is to checkmate. We
have the councilors and the committees from the
legislatures” (Local Government Official).
“It is retiring (of expenditure). Most of the auditors,
treasurers ….. are perfect.....they know the best way to handle
whatever finance we have” (Local Government Official).
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“The treasurer is signatory to the account, then the
HOD health ….then somebody from the community, so,
that there will be proper monitoring and there will be
partnership between the community and the LG” (Local
Government Official).
Furthermore, the two development partners at the na-
tional and State level stated that they have put in place,
systems to ensure judicious use of funds released to the
government, and these include: (i) periodic audits of ac-
counts; (ii) fiduciary risk assessment procedures; (iii)
diligence assessment which checks governments’ ability
to monitor its own contracts and guard against abuse;
(iv) spot checks and audits of accounting books and doc-
uments. All these have been incorporated into a UN tool
called the “National Execution Modalities for Fund man-
agement”. These checks are done to establish account-
ability at the national level and by extrapolation, the
sub-national levels. In the words of one of the develop-
ment partners:
“what we do with them is diligence assessment but for
government what we do is fiduciary risk assessment,
before we provide money to government systems”; “we
make sure that they not only use them but keep it for
audit purposes, so we go in for spot checks, we call it
financial program monitoring” (Development Partner).
Current challenges in accountability
A majority of the respondents stressed that there were
issues with trust, transparency and corruption in govern-
ment especially where it concerns fund management. Al-
most all respondents opined that corruption within the
health system is one major barrier to success of the
BHCPF. As noted by a respondent “like you know the
issue of corruption also exists in the health system among
health workers including those at the health facility
especially those who sell government drugs and LGA level
who collect money before posting you to a health
facility……..In fact it is everywhere in the health system
(Local Government Official).
Corruption in the health sector has made various
health institutions to be ineffective while scarce
resources invested in the sector are wasted. Health sys-
tem corruption prevails in Nigeria among different
actors including senior and junior administrative officers
in health ministries, parastatals and agencies, health offi-
cials and among political office holders. This is because
there is no adherence to the rule of law, coupled with
lack of transparency and trust. In addition, the public
sector in Nigeria is ruled by ineffective civil service
codes and weak accountability mechanisms, among
others [10].
Interference at higher levels of government also con-
tribute to making funds inaccessible to implementers
when they need them, and the result is that funds are
not utilized for planned activities. According to most of
the State respondents, the federal level officers are usu-
ally more interested in organizing workshops where they
are expected to be paid per diems and DSA or more in-
terested in procurement activities with attendant kick-
backs. As a result, they are more inclined to releasing
money to such activities at the expense of releasing
money to ensure access to health services. This was cap-
tured thus:
“Some officers from the Ministry of health and even at
the federal are just interested in going from one workshop
to another collecting per diems and that’s all…” (State
Government Official).
Some Federal people are more interested in the
commission they will collect if they issue out contracts
for jobs…..(State Government Official).
“The FMOH, should show the stewardship role ….to ensure
that we do not create another source for procurement or
doing only conferences with the money. So that the money
will be targeted to … providing access to health care” (State
Government Official).
Overall, political interests interfere with primary health
care resource allocation and distribution in Nigeria and
in terms of health distribution, historically and up till
now, they are highly dependent on political influences
and peoples’ influences [11]. There is the tendency for
political office holders to attract development projects,
including PHC infrastructure and services, to their own
locality regardless of need. Political interests also influ-
ence programme implementation for example according
to a respondent, “if you ask for local workers to participate
in national or state immunization programmes they will
only submit their relations whether they are qualified or
not. They even influence who is posted to the health
centers” (Local Government Official).
Also, some politicians have been seen to pay attention
to health services or programmes that are either high on
the global or national agenda, or for which funding is
available, or that would guarantee immediate results and
electorates’ support.
Poor data management constitutes a challenge to
accountability because data are needed to make deci-
sions and plan. Majority of the respondents feel there is
hardly any data collection taking place, and where there
is it is neither easily available nor reliable Although the
current information management system in Nigeria is
deemed adequate in terms of structure of collation and
transmission, there are notable shortfalls in its ability to
deliver timely, reliable and complete data for several rea-
sons. For example, a respondent noted that “there are so
many different types of forms in the facilities which the
health workers are expected to fill… you have for malaria,
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you have for TB, you have for HIV, you have for pregnant
women…….they do not have that kind of time to fill them”
(Local Government Official). Furthermore, the culture of
routine analysis of the data and feedback to health institu-
tions, and its use for health planning and improvement of
health outcomes is yet to take root [12].
The capacity to collect, collate and analyse data is
perceived to be relatively poor at the primary care
facility level compared to higher levels of reporting
and service delivery. However, it was stated that
health information management for vertical disease
control programmes such as HIV and malaria is
more effective at generating reliable data than the
integrated system. Consequently, health planning and
priority setting are not based on evidence of the ac-
curate epidemiological profile of the population.
The system is equally completely without informa-
tion on services delivered in the non-state sector and
lacks the mechanism to capture such data. This was
captured by a respondent thus: “self-treatment or
treatment from traditional and religious healers
typically go undocumented by health workers”. (Local
Government Official).
The weakness in the system is reflected at all levels of
the health system and has been attributed to weak gov-
ernance and poor commitment to duty, poor funding
and infrastructure, weak capacity and inadequate
personnel and skills in data management. In addition,
sharing financial information in Nigeria is a very sensi-
tive issue and there is a lack of political will to share
financial data and lack of financial information is wide-
spread, especially at the LGA level.
Political commitment from the State in relation to re-
lease of funds for health activities was also mentioned as
a challenge by most of the respondents, especially where
implementation requires multiple political and bureau-
cratic stakeholders. The long waiting period from when
the budget is announced and when actual release of
funds is made was said to be a major problem because it
undermined implementers’ ability to plan appropriately
for their activities.
One respondent observed that where it concerns
the BHCPF, “technocrats have to depend on
politicians to provide the counterpart fund, and if
the politicians do not support the bill, technocrats
will not be able to do much in implementation”
(State Government Official).
Poor motivation, mentorship, monitoring and supervi-
sion were cited as key challenges to health workers’ per-
formance and that in order to foster a sense of
responsibility and accountability in the staff there needs
to be: (i) a reward system for performance; (ii) institu-
tionalized mentorship to give workers a sense of fulfill-
ment; and (iii) strengthened supervision and monitoring
of activities to be able to detect staff who are derailing
to put them back on track:
“There has to be check and balance. You don’t just give
somebody money and leave him to do whatever he likes.
You should be inspecting what he is doing to know
whether he is derailing, whether he is doing the actual
thing he is asked to do” (Federal Government Official).
Respondents at the state and LGA levels expressed
concern about the failure of past financial reforms to
achieve set goals as a result of mismanagement and di-
version of funds. At the LGA level, it was stated that
some government officials might see the BHCPF as an
opportunity for them to accumulate wealth for them-
selves, and they could deliberately work against the ac-
countability system by ensuring that the mechanisms
put in place to ensure accountability are not imple-
mented. A respondent stated that a bottleneck to proper
accountability could arise from the states if the money
meant for the local government is not provided com-
pletely or at the right time. This of course will impact
on the planning and efficient utilization of funds to pro-
vide needed services at the local government level. There
was a consensus opinion that the absence of guidelines
for managing the funds could present a challenge to im-
plementers, among who are poorly trained and incompe-
tent managers:
“So, there should be a system (guideline) on ground to
carry out these programmes. I told you that the primary
health care has a big challenge as far as manpower is
concerned because in some places, we have incompetent
people managing the system; who are not very
knowledgeable about what they are doing” (Local
Government Official).
The key challenges outlined by development partners
at both federal and state level are: (i) weak financial
management and accountability systems in government
which deter donors from funding the Nigerian health-
care system; (ii) weak capacity to implement suggested
accountability mechanisms due to political interference
with accountability structures; (iii) tendency of govern-
ment officials and politicians to pursue their personal in-
terests. Some supporting quotes are:
“Because that fund is going to be contributed by many,
there will be many players. … the fiduciary arrangement
around it needs to be very robust because currently many
donors are not able to put funding into government
systems in Nigeria. For that vision in the Bill to actually
come to reality, the accountability system for that Fund
will have to be much stronger than there is in Nigerian
environment” (Civil Society Organization).
“Government systems are designed to hold government
accountable, it is just implementing it, what we should
just be looking for is how can we force their hands to
adhere to the system” (Civil Society Organization).
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Proposed accountability mechanisms for the BHCPF
(external and internal)
Five (5) accountability levels and key stakeholders ex-
pected to implement the BHCPF are:
1. The Federal government (Federal Ministry of
Health, NPHCDA, NHIS, Federal Ministry of
Finance-FMOF);
2. The State government (State Ministry of Health,
SPHCB, State Ministry of Finance, Ministry of
Local Government);
3. The Local government (LGHA);
4. PHC frontline Health facilities (Health workers,
Health facility committees and
5. External actors (Development partners and donors,
CSOs, Community members).
To ensure accountability of the proposed BHCP fund,
an overall accountability framework for its implementa-
tion has been proposed (Fig. 2). In developing this
framework, the authors took into consideration the
views of the different actors regarding the current chal-
lenges in accountability, as well as their ideas on how to
address them in future. The framework is proposed as a
coherent set of mechanisms that must be implemented
at and across the different levels of the health system,
working together to ensure accountability. They encom-
pass planning mechanisms, strong and transparent mon-
itoring and supervision systems, and systematic
reporting at different levels of the healthcare system.
It is hoped that this accountability framework will add
to the accountability literature and help in dealing with
some of the current accountability challenges including
trust and transparency, interference at higher levels cor-
ruption in the health system, poor data management,
poor motivation, mentorship, monitoring and supervi-
sion of health workers.
Planning mechanisms
This planning mechanism involves development of im-
plementation guidelines, development of a costed roll
out plan of activities, establishment of the State PHC
Boards (SPHCB) and State Health Insurance Scheme
(NHIS), building the capacity of State and Local Govern-
ment Health Authorities to disburse Fund and systems
for procurement and management of funds.
Development of implementation guidelines Several
national level respondents were of the opinion that the
federal ministry of health should develop clear guidelines
about who is responsible for implementing the fund and
what their roles will be. When these are developed, they
should be used by the State, LGA and PHC frontline
health workers as shown in the arrow in Fig. 2. They
suggested that specification of tasks and responsibilities
of implementers at the state and local government and
frontline PHC levels would enable accountability since
people will better understand their roles and what is
expected of them at every point in time. The use of
implementation guidelines was stated as a means of
achieving this, thus streamlining the activities of the
state and LGA staff. According to one of them:
“There is this responsibility. Everybody is alive to it,
and guidelines must be circulated so that everybody at
any point knows what they are doing” (Federal Government
Official).
“things don’t usually happen the way you want them to
unless you outline them…….and when specific guidelines
and regulations are documented, it’s easier to measure
outcome” (Civil Society Organization) .
One of the reasons for the Nigerian weak health
system is the lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities
among key stakeholders at the different levels of govern-
ment [13]. And as noted elsewhere the clarity in the
roles of stakeholders and implementers, and the nature
of relationships between key actors, are recognized as
critical to policy implementation [14, 15].
Some authors have stressed that ambiguity of roles was
related to confusion among stakeholders about the objec-
tives, scope of practice, responsibilities and anticipated
outcomes of the roles of stakeholders [16]. Variable stake-
holder awareness and competing stakeholder expectations
also has been noted to contribute to a lack of role clarity
[17]. According to the authors, when the role means
different things to different people and there is lack of
consensus about role expectations, role conflict and role
overload can occur. Therefore, it is expected that clarity of
roles and responsibilities through production of appropri-
ate implementation guidelines will enhance both internal
and external accountability measures.
Furthermore, concerning the implementation guide-
line, there was a consensus across all levels that since it
will be a national document, it must be communicated
in such a way that all implementing states and LGAs
would understand and find useful to guide their plans
and actions. This was captured by a respondent thus:
“It is very important that the guideline is well spelt
out….such that the person in Lagos will understand it as
clearly as the person in Adamawa or Borno State. It will
be a national guideline that everyone can fit” (Federal
Government Officer).
Communicating the guidelines is very important as
studies have shown that inability to communicate policy
and guidelines to health program implementers resulted
in misinterpretation of health programs [18]. Due to
limited policy dissemination and awareness, many stake-
holders are usually uninformed regarding the policy
objectives and implementation strategy and the agencies
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responsible for implementation. The limited health com-
munication in the context of changing healthcare envi-
ronments and diverse populations is also an important
underpinning of rising healthcare costs and sustained
health disparities. And as has been noted elsewhere, the
key issue for communicating strategy should be able to
align the extent and scope of the change in healthcare
environment and the approaches of implementation of
the changes with the values and principles outlined in
the related policy document in question [19].
Most respondents felt that all levels of government,
but particularly the implementers, need to sustain their
commitments towards achieving the Fund’s goals, and
that this would be made easier for them if they are clear
about their roles and the limits to them.
Development of a costed roll out plan of activities
The development of a costed roll out plan of activities by
the federal government, State, LGA and PHC frontline
health workers was proposed by a majority of the respon-
dents as a good approach to managing the funds. This
would first involve the development of a plan of all the ac-
tivities needed within a certain period, followed by peri-
odic budgets based on the plan and then a justification of
how the money was spent with accompanying evidence
and outputs to show. This is expected to serve as the basis
for resource allocation and mutual accountability by all
stakeholders – government, development partners, civil
society and communities. Reference was made of the suc-
cess of a previously funded project that had been carried
out by the local government using this approach:
Fig. 2 Accountability Framework for BHCPF
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“we can do what we call redraft the plan, you make a
roll out plan for the activities and that roll out plan we
cost it, after costing it, you see the specific area the money
will go”.(State Government Official).
To operationalize the costed plan, it was suggested
by respondents that at the federal level a committee
should be constituted to ensure that BHCP fund is
captured in the budget.
“an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Innovative Financing
should be formed to ensure that the 1% CRF is ap-
propriated in the budget” (Civil Society Organization).
This is particularly important because despite the signing
of the bill in 2014, the 1% CRF was not captured in the
2016 and 2017 budget. According to the respondent, the
formation of this committee will ensure this does not hap-
pen in future. This committee will also ensure that guide-
lines, manuals & strategic plans are developed at the
national level.
At the State and LGA levels, the costed plan of activ-
ities was to be submitted for access to the stipulated
fund which will enable proper accountability. And to
operationalize the plan, at the State and LGA levels, the
stakeholders outlined in the proposed accountability
framework at these levels (SMOH, SPHCB, SMOF, Min-
istry of Local Government) should ensure that the coun-
terpart funding of 25% is captured in the budget, annual
State and LGA operational plans and is drawn and
reflected in the medium-term expenditure framework as
well as medium term sector strategy.
Establishment of the state PHC boards (SPHCB) and
state health insurance scheme (SHIS) and building
the capacity of members to disburse fund The States
should establish the SPHCB which is a requisite for bene-
fiting from the fund and the NHIS. These institutions
should be backed by laws enacted by the State Legislators.
The SPHCB should then develop their strategic health de-
velopment plan which should embrace the concept of one
management, one plan and one monitoring and evalu-
ation for PHC in the State otherwise referred to as “PHC
Under One Roof” (PHCUOR). This concept is modelled
on guidelines developed by the World Health
Organization for integrated district-based service delivery
to strengthen PHC services through reducing the frag-
mentation of PHC service management [20]. However, an
issue in the fund’s institutional arrangement, which state
and LGA level respondents were concerned would be a
major challenge to implementation is who heads this
SPHCB. The reason this could be an issue is that the dir-
ect implementers of PHC activities, and consequently the
Fund, are the LGAs who will also be contributing a signifi-
cant amount to the states counterpart. Meanwhile, the Bill
appears to be silent on LGA level arrangements for man-
aging the Fund. As captured by a respondent:
“The truth is there have been hiccups here and there
about setting up that board. It is like who is going to be
in control, ….the LG expect that they being the providers
of most of the fund (LGA counterpart) they should be in
control” (Local Government Official).
It was also suggested that a legal framework where
funders and implementers sign an agreement gives the
state a sense of responsibility and commitment. As cap-
tured by a respondent:
“Having a legal frame work … which they are going to
sign; some of them will now resign if they don’t have good
intentions“(Local Government Official).
Building the capacity of the members of the SPHCB
and SHIS to disburse Fund revenue effectively was
stressed as part of the planning for accountability. It has
been observed that, “regardless of the precise nature of a
policy or strategy, and the support that exists for it, if
the means to implement it are inadequate in terms of
capacity or capability, or both, then it will count for lit-
tle” [21]. However, one of the major criticisms of cap-
acity building is that it is a ‘top-down’ approach that is
often linked to a government’s agendas for change. But,
Fitzgerald makes the point that this can also be a
strength [22]. He argues that when initiatives are sup-
ported and reinforced by ‘systems’ they are probably
more likely to be sustainable. Therefore, building the
capacity of the States and LGA by the federal should be
seen as a strength in the fund management and this can
be reinforced from time to time to ensure sustainability.
Systems for procurement and management of funds
All the development partners interviewed were of the
opinion that the federal government should establish a
robust system of procurement and management of
funds. It was argued that this will enhance internal ac-
countability and minimize corruption. The use of stra-
tegic procurement systems in the purchase of drugs and
other essential commodities was suggested as a means of
achieving better value for money having made an obser-
vation that the cost of pharmaceuticals in Nigeria is
more than it ought to be. This was captured by one of
the development partners thus:
“I think that there is a big opportunity to look at the pro-
curement system … and be more strategic about procure-
ment. Because if you look at the cost of pharmaceuticals in
Nigeria, it is way beyond what it should be, and actually
we could get a lot better value for money when we use a
strategic procurement system” (Development Partner).
Strong monitoring and supervision systems
This involves the institutionalization of a supportive super-
vision and mentorship programs, performance-based finan-
cing, Strong and transparent independent oversight role
and improved data management.
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Supportive supervision and mentorship In general,
supportive supervision is a process of guiding, monitor-
ing, and coaching workers to promote compliance with
standards of practice and assure the delivery of quality
care service. The need for constant and supportive
supervision and monitoring by the State as well as men-
toring and training on how to address specific challenges
was emphasized by majority of respondents at the LGA
level as a good accountability strategy.
The Nigerian national strategic health development
plan recognises the need to establish and institutionalize
a framework for an integrated supportive supervision
with adequate committed resources for all types and
levels of care providers across public and private sectors
[23]. This could be leveraged by the fund managers.
Some of the State and LGA respondents were also of the
opinion that supportive monitoring and supervision for
health workers at the facility by the LGA would guard
against waste and prevent health workers in the facilities
from managing the BHCPF in the ways they deem fit.
This is very important because from LGA responses,
systems are actually in place to ensure accountability
within the context of systems for procurement and man-
agement of funds. However, compliance is the main
issue, and this was echoed by development partners. So
supportive supervision and mentorship is likely to ad-
dress and promote compliance. Thus, as shown in the
framework, the State will supervise the LGA and the
LGA will supervise the PHC frontline. The institutional-
ized mentorship is likely to give workers a sense of ful-
fillment while strengthened supervision and monitoring
of activities will be able to detect staff who are derailing
and put them back on track.
It was recommended that the use of reward and
mentorship-based monitoring and evaluation system
comprising of different levels of participants, including
community members, would increase community par-
ticipation, ensure fund management compliance and im-
prove accountability for the Fund. This system would be
such that states that are not doing so well are mentored
and trained on how to go about addressing their specific
challenges. The need to discuss the evidence documen-
tation and reports pertaining to implementing and man-
aging the funds at all levels, and with the community, to
encourage participation and foster transparency in the
management of the fund was also noted:
“You can just do a report and that will end in my
office. But there should be a process of socializing, breaking
the evidence at all levels: local, community and all” (State
Government Official).
Performance-based financing Most of the national
level and development partners’ respondents, as well as
some local government officials, believed states and
LGAs should institutionalize the practice of
results-based financing both as a reward system and as
an accountability system. Here, new disbursements are
conditional on the results of previous disbursements and
these results could be monitored using some perform-
ance indicators. This should be developed at the State
level and implemented at the LGA and PHC frontline as
depicted in Fig. 2. They believed that to address issues of
accountability at any level especially the local govern-
ment level, performance indicators should be tied to dis-
bursement of funds. They also suggested that
peer-review mechanisms, and healthy inter-state and
inter-LGA competitions could motivate states and LGAs
to want to increase their output to get more funding.
These were captured by some of the respondents thus:
“I think that for the PHC fund, there needs to be per-
formance indicators that needs to be tied to the disburse-
ment of this fund, because if not, if we don’t address the
issues of accountability, it is like putting money into the
black hole” (Local Government Official).
“The concept of results-based financing is coming to
play here, and if the states get used to it, there will be more
accountability and transparency” (Federal Government
Officer).
“I think that for the PHC fund, there needs to be
performance indicators that needs to be tied to the
disbursement of this fund, because if not, if we don’t
address the issues of accountability, it is like putting
money into the black hole” (Development Partner).
Results Based Financing (RBF) – also known as
Performance Based Financing (PBF) or Payment for
performance (P4P) – involves the payment of financial
rewards to health facilities or health workers based on
their achievement of performance targets. Many experts
see the introduction of RBF schemes as an opportunity
to strengthen, or even reform, health systems; however,
they are also a potential source of new risks and chal-
lenges that are not well understood [24].
RBF can enhance accountability and improve health
information systems since reported results are verified
when linked to incentives. Local authorities verify
results, which are publicized for each organization or
health facility. A rigorous impact evaluation of the RBF
scheme in Rwanda demonstrates that RBF can have
strong positive impacts [25], but our understanding of
why RBF has such positive effects in Rwanda is still very
limited, and thus it is unclear whether such schemes
could have a similar potential in other settings. Other
authors have also recorded some successes with RBF in
Tanzania [26]. It has also improved both external and
internal accountability in a Tanzanian pilot study [27].
Although the RBF does not directly attack the overall
environment of corruption, it is a way of promoting
efficient public service delivery, offering less incentive or
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opportunity for diversion of funds than current payment
systems [28]. However, some authors have noted the
potential risks of RBF in relation to non-targeted service
use [29].
In Nigeria PBF is being implemented in 3 states of
Nigeria- Adamawa, Nasarawa and Ondo by by
NPHCDA and the SPHCDB of the 3 states under the
Nigeria State Health Investment Project (NSHIP). It
aims to improve health results by providing health facil-
ities autonomy and make them accountable and moti-
vated for results. Under NSHIP, roles of the states and
LGAs are clearly defined with their result indicators, and
the financial incentives are provided on the achievement
of the indicators. PBF also provides direct finance to
health centers based on the quantity and quality of ser-
vices delivered, and the PHCs have autonomy in using it
to improve health services [30].
Although other types of inputs do often accompany
PBF reform packages, like capacity building through
training, mentoring and supervision, and coaching
and technical assistance on measurement, use of im-
proved management tools and how to increase re-
sults, a key challenge for instituting PBF for the
BHCPF will be data management as the current infor-
mation system is poor with lack of capacity at PHC
frontline health facilities to implement it. So, for PBF
to be effective for the BHCPF, there is need to
improve and strengthen the information system and
build capacity of PHC frontline health workers.
From a funding point of view, sustainability is likely to
depend on a combination of government buy-in and
continued external support as all PBF packages in
Nigeria are highly dependent on external support.
Strong and transparent independent oversight role
The Oversight of the BHCPF recognizes the huge invest-
ment by the Government of Nigeria (GoN) towards the
improvement of PHC. It further recognizes the need to
ensure that there is ‘value for money’ and most import-
ant that Nigerian communities, the primary beneficiar-
ies, derive the expected benefits from the Fund.
Government agencies require objective oversight of any
major technical initiative to ensure that projects are
being properly managed, resources are being properly
deployed and goals are being met.
In this regard, effective systems for oversight of the
implementation of the Fund is proposed to be put in
place to ensure periodic accountability and progress
reporting to the federal government. The objective is to
provide independent oversight and validation at all
levels; federal, state, local government and PHC front-
line, of the Fund’s implementation, monitor progress
and ensure delivery on the targets. This oversight func-
tion should be carried out by development partners and
CSOs as shown in Fig. 2. Having an independent and
unbiased partner in the BHCPF’s success will give lead-
ership valuable insight into potential risks, areas for im-
provement and even “blind spots” in the internal
governance and management of the Fund. It will also
ensure accountability.
The involvement of Community members, through
Health Facility Committees, in decisions regarding how
health facility revenue is spent is also important. Active
community participation was emphasized by majority of
respondents at the LGA level as the presence of commu-
nity members for example will help contain government
excesses.
“Community members should be involved because they
will serve as the watch dog” (Local Government Official).
Thus, involvement of community members in the re-
lease of funds for primary health care activities was per-
ceived to be a useful strategy for ensuring accountability
since they can monitor how the funds are being spent.
These were captured by the following quotes:
“If any money is being released, for primary healthcare
projects, the Vanguard committee on good governance
within the communities should be notified about funds”
(State Government Official).
However, a dissenting voice was of the opinion that in-
volving community members would be a mistake be-
cause multiple interests are represented, and this is
difficult to manage. According to him,
“the lowest individual in the community is always
looking for money and if they know money is coming they
will like to get their own share thinking of their own
interest and so the goal will not be achieved” (Local
Government Official).
The community members through the health facility
committees usually helps to raise awareness on health
disparities issues, and they create a link between com-
munities that are often underserved and facility as well
as the legislative members (councillors) that represent
the communities’ health needs. This is important in
helping move towards health and social equity as well as
greater accountability.
Improved data management Part of the challenges of
current accountability system as reported by the respon-
dents is poor data management. Most of the challenges
in data management according to the Nigerian health
systems assessment report 2014, are in the areas of data
governance, data quality and use of Information. There-
for the proposed accountability mechanism involves the
institution of good data management system. Effective
and efficient planning, monitoring and evaluation of
health services depends on reliable data. This will help
to monitor the progress towards stated goals and targets
of the BHCPF. The information process will involve data
Uzochukwu et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2018) 17:100 Page 12 of 16
collection and analysis at the community and PHC level
and transmission of such information to the LGA, State,
federal and development partners as shown in the
framework. There is also a feedback of the information
to the health facility.
Specific intervention for data management should in-
volve development of state M&E framework, ocnduct
M&E/HMIS training for LGA and facility staff, provide
adequate tools to health facilities and conduct regular
data quality assurance. Thus, State governments should
print and distribute to LGAs and health facilities data
tools and data equipment. Capacity building of health
workers on the tools should be of priority for effective
data collection. Routine data quality assessment should
be conducted to validate data generated.
Systematic and transparent reporting
This entails external auditors to monitor implementa-
tion, separation of BHCPF account from the State LGA
and facility health accounts, use of electronic and Bank
payment, external auditors, open book system and on-
line reporting and generation of quarterly reports.
External auditors to monitor implementation At the
national level, the level-specific accountability strength-
ening strategies would be the use of external auditors to
monitor and evaluate their financial activities across
both federal, State, LGA and frontline levels, and publi-
cation of financial reports about the BHCPF on their
websites for ease of access. It was also suggested to con-
sider making dispersal of revenue from NPHCDA to
SPHCB conditional on the results of previous
disbursements.
The CSO respondents were of the view that in order
to improve the accountability system in government at
all levels, there should be an open-book policy, where
the government’s accounts and books are open to audit-
ing by the public and external auditing by CSOs,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and commu-
nity groups is encouraged:
“I think external auditors in the form of community,
CSOs, NGOs should be part of the monitoring and there
should be openness and auditing and publication” (Civil
Society Organization).
Separation of BHCPF account from the state LGA
and facility health account Separation of BHCPF from
State, LGA health account was suggested on the premise
that it will make record keeping easier and management
better and therefore ease of accountability. Also, at the
facility level, it was suggested that a separate BHCPF ac-
count should be opened for the same reasons and com-
munity members involved in its management.
The success of having a separate facility account and
involving the community in fund management has been
documented. For example, in the HSSF in Kenya central
funds are credited directly into a facility’s bank account
quarterly, and facility funds are managed by health facil-
ity management committees including community rep-
resentatives. An evaluation of the programme showed
that HSSF funds were reaching facilities; funds were be-
ing overseen and used in a way that strengthened trans-
parency and community involvement. It also improved
health workers’ motivation and patient satisfaction [31].
However, there were challenges – such as complex
and centralized accounting requirements wider negative
impacts (in Kenya, difficulties for facilities in accessing
crucial user fee funds), and lack of clarity in the roles
and responsibilities of key actors [31]. Perhaps most crit-
ically, given the potential for misappropriation and mis-
use in peripheral facilities [32], there is a need to
balance fiduciary oversight with administrative and mon-
itoring burdens as has been noted by some authors [33].
Use of electronic and Bank payment, external audi-
tors, open book system and online reporting Respon-
dents at the state and LGA level felt that the current
auditing systems are too porous and highly bureaucratic
and would benefit from reinforcements. There was a sug-
gestion that using electronic and bank payments for trans-
actions between consumers and service providers would
make the system more transparent by eliminating the
middlemen who jeopardize the whole system, and promote
good record keeping. It would also improve trust and ac-
countability in managing the Fund and hence reduce cor-
ruption. And as noted by some of the respondents:
“The community banking process at PHC level should
be initiated so as to keep a record of fund management
at this level” (State Government Official).
“Any payment in this fund should be e-payment. That
is the only thing I want to suggest… e-payment reduces
fraud” (Local Government Official).
It was also proposed that credible honest individuals
who have the appropriate qualification should be
employed at federal, state, LGA and frontline levels.
Thus, the use of qualified and experienced accountants
and use of external auditors and publishing financial re-
ports on SPHCB websites in accordance with the Free-
dom of Information and Fiscal Appropriation Act were
suggested. They opined that if financial reports of gov-
ernment are made publicly accessible through the inter-
net, people can access the information using their
mobile phones. This would encourage transparency and
reinforce accountability and ensure equity. A respondent
captured it thus:
“there needs to build an accountability relationship
with the general public…..you can have a financial report
Uzochukwu et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2018) 17:100 Page 13 of 16
put online, such that anybody can go and access that
information and everybody will be in the know on what
is happening” (Local Government Official).
“there is too much corruption in Nigeria now. Money
disappears at every level … but you can check this by
employing people who are basically honest, and if you
make them comfortable, they can keep their hands off
public money, so it really matters” (State Government
Official).
However, the manner by which qualification would
enable accountability was not stated by respondents, but
the rationale could be that people who are trained for a
particular position and have attained a certain level of
education would better understand the scope of their
jobs and appreciate the need for an effective health care
system.
The CSOs respondents on the other hand were of the
view that to improve the accountability system in
government at all levels, there should be an open-book
policy, where the government’s accounts and books are
open to auditing by the public and external auditing by
CSOs, NGOs, and community groups is encouraged.
They were also of the opinion that specific guidelines for
implementation of this would ensure that things are
done right.
“I think external auditors in the form of community,
CSOs, NGOs should be part of the monitoring and there
should be openness and auditing and publication” (Civil
Society Organization).
Generation of quarterly reports At both State, LGA
and facility level, quarterly reports should be generated
based on all the activities including financial and activity
reports. The report should include successes and identi-
fying obstacles to progress and limitations for all the
proposed timeliness as in the costed plan with corrective
actions attributable to named individuals. However, the
capacities of these actors need to be built on delivering
these critical actions because building and sustaining a
narrative for health equity requires capacities to make
these documents and decision processes/outcomes
available.
A government official perceived that a good reporting
system would be essential for better accountability, and
suggested that reporting tools and aids should be made
easily accessible to implementers:
“the tools for reporting should be placed at points
where they are required so that if you want to report it
shouldn’t be that you don’t have the tools”.(Federal Gov-
ernment Official).
The report should include utilization updates on
drugs, vaccines, immunization etc. In doing this it is im-
portant to note that the time taken for health workers to
fill these tools could eat into the time used by them to
see their patients and efforts should be made to reduce
this and unmanageable paperwork is avoided. In the
health sector services funds (HSSF) study in Kenya many
interviewees reported that completion of required re-
ports took significant amounts of in-charges’ time [31].
Conclusion
In general the respondents were of the opinion that the
goals of the fund, could be achieved on the conditions
that there is: (i) a written, well communicated imple-
mentation guideline for the fund; (ii) sustained political
commitment; (iii) transparency of the implementing
actors; (iv) establishment of the SPHCB with clear
responsibilities for the state and local government; (v)
proper awareness and education of both users and pro-
viders; and (vi) timely release of fund. Most respondents
felt that all levels of government, but particularly the
implementers, need to sustain their commitments
towards achieving the Fund’s goals, and that this would
be made easier for them if they are clear about their
roles and the limits to them.
Critical, current challenges of health care accountabil-
ity in Nigeria include trust, transparency and corruption
in the health system, political interference at higher
levels of government, poor data management, lack of
political commitment from the State in relation to
release of funds for health activities, poor motivation,
mentorship, monitoring and supervision, weak financial
management and accountability systems and weak
capacity to implement suggested accountability mecha-
nisms due to political interference with accountability
structures.
These challenges highlight the need for careful and
comprehensive action to safeguard the value of the new
Basic HealthCare Provision Fund and ensure that newly
available resources are used for the intended purpose.
This paper has proposed a framework to guide the
development of the implementation of strengthened
accountability for the BHCPF, based on understanding
of current challenges and multiple actors’ views of how
to address them.
Critically, the framework offers a system-wide ap-
proach to strengthening accountability - working across
all tiers of the health system, engaging multiple actors
and involving multiple mechanisms. It is not enough to
introduce a mechanism at LGA or state level, and it is
absolutely essential to work at every level and cascade
mechanisms up and down levels and work with external
actors and internal actors. Strengthening accountability
demands action across the system as a whole, working
with financing, performance and political accountability
and combining external and internal mechanisms.
Furthermore, it is important to monitor the usage of
the BHCP Fund at the federal, state, and local levels
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which should be conducted regularly to ensure equity in
healthcare provision. This is essential because health
equity is not very high on the policy agenda, thus creat-
ing a problem of affordability and accessibility among
the poor and the less advantaged groups in Nigeria.
Limitations of the study
Our sample of stakeholders at all levels was not intended
to be representative of the whole country, but rather
those who have a practical range of views from their ex-
perience with the Nigerian health system. The views of
the media in accountability structure and mechanisms
were not evaluated in this study. This will form a basis
for a further study.
The results of this study cannot be generalized to
other settings because of the various contextual factors
that may play out in those settings including their level
of health systems performance and availability of inter-
ventions to strengthen the health systems.
Finally, this paper did not set out to present a fully
conceptualized framework, but instead, initial ideas to-
wards such a framework. However, the value of the
paper lies in presenting the findings of the inquiry that
led to this framework and this framework has been used
by policy makers as a valuable guide for the develop-
ment of operational plan for the implementation of the
Basic HealthCare Provision Fund (BHCPF) by the Fed-
eral Ministry of Health and other key stakeholders [34].
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